A year after his death, Osama bin Laden remains what he had been for many years, an iconic figurehead for the jihadist movement.
For security reasons, Osama bin Laden had not been actively directing al-Qa’ida for some years prior to his death. In any case, ‘core’ al-Qa‘ida – like most jihadi groups – has been constructed horizontally so that command activities are delegated and key leaders liaise closely with at least one deputy.
Under Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, ‘core’ al-Qa‘ida is no longer the powerful terror group it was. The wider organization, however, called al-Qa‘ida and Associated Movements (AQAM) by Western intelligence organizations, remains dangerous and is larger and further-reaching than ever.
Over the years, the senior leadership – and in particular al-Zawahiri – has developed a complex network of franchises (al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb), allies (for example the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban), affiliated groups such as Boko Haram, sleeper cells of home-grown terrorists (like the men who carried out the London bombings) and so-called ‘lone-wolf’ attackers (like Mohammed Mehra who murdered seven in Toulouse in March this year).
In addition, al-Qa‘ida has spent years embedding itself in other causes and insurgencies: in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Somalia and, most recently, in Northern Mali where separatist Tuaregs, supported by al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb fighters, have declared the independent state of Azawad.
Although they were surprised at first by the Arab Spring, AQAM groups have been quick to exploit the resultant regional insecurity to expand their operation room. AQAM fighters were identified among the ranks of the Libyan rebels and al-Qa‘ida flags were flown in post-revolutionary Benghazi. Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb say they have seized large quantities of weapons from stockpiles abandoned by Gadaffi’s men, while al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula took over parts of southern and central Yemen in the chaos of revolution. Iraqi, Jordanian and Lebanese security services speak of hundreds of jihadis migrating into Syria to join the battle against Assad. Turmoil in Egypt saw the formation of a new group, al-Qa‘ida in the Sinai Peninsula, which poses a threat to Israel and fulfils one of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s long-standing ambitions.
AQAM is like a mature tree whose branches show above the surface but which is supported by a huge and complex underground root system.
Cutting off a branch (even big branches like Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki) is unlikely to weaken the roots which are nurtured by a fertile mix of grievances and hopes. This is the problem for those waging ‘war on terror’.
The Arab Spring, however, potentially offers an alternative route for those grievances and hopes – and a more realistic chance for consensus-based solutions - which might ultimately weaken AQAM if allowed to evolve unimpeded.
It is not surprising that elections in Tunisia and Egypt favoured Islamist parties – for many years such groups had been the only voice of dissent and many people want their new governments to operate on the Islamic principles which form the basis of their own identity. A new debate on the nature of an Islamic state has begun, engaging both moderates and extremists.
The electoral failure of secular, liberal parties could also be seen as a vote against continued Western interference – military, economic, political and cultural. A position, until now, closely associated with Osama bin laden and AQAM.
In response we have seen the West develop a new policy - what Tony Blair describes as ‘controlled change’ – working behind the scenes in an effort to maintain its influence in the region.
At the same time, Washington is covering all possibilities by opening the doors for diplomacy with both the Taliban and the Moslem Brotherhood.
The future of the ‘war on terror’ and the continued security of Israel – quite apart from the supply of oil and many other concerns – depend on the willingness of the region’s new governments to co-operate with the West.
There are already signs of interference with the democratic process begun by the Arab Spring – in Egypt, ten out of twenty three Presidential candidates (including the two leading Islamist contenders) have been banned, while Libya’s interim government says no parties based on tribal loyalties, ethnicity or religion can participate in June’s parliamentary elections.
Designed to exclude the most radical Islamists from power, these policies may prove self-defeating. One of history’s most violent jihadi groups, Algeria’sGroupe Islamiste Armee (GIA), emerged when Islamist political party, the FIS, was prevented from taking power having won free and fair elections in 1991.
But given a platform, and the moderating influence of debate with the wider public, even the extremists might discover a new political pragmatism and ultimately renounce violence. Ayman al-Zawahiri is not absolutely opposed to the ballot box: in 2009 he said ‘Elections under the umbrella of an Islamic constitution, run by trustworthy hands, are to be welcomed’.
A recent study by US think-tank RAND concluded that one of just five ways all terrorist groups eventually come to an end is, ‘The group joins the political process’.
If right conditions were put in place, might jihadi groups enter the political arena either by forming a political wing (in the way that the IRA formed Sinn Fein) or by proxy?
A new political paradigm should be allowed to emerge in the Middle East which embraces wider society in all its complexities and offers real solutions to long-standing grievances. It is here that a real chance to end the kind of violent jihad espoused by bin Laden might be found.
