Egypt’s new President Mohammad Morsi surprised even seasoned observers like myself with a bold declaration on Sunday, granting himself overall legislative and executive power.
In addition he has disturbed the status quo in Arab-Israeli relations by sending troops into Sinai last week - something which has not occurred since the 1973 Arab-Israel war and abrogates the Security Annex of the Camp David accords.
In June, the ruling junta, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), had dissolved parliament and retained all significant powers for themselves. Morsi’s move swept the metaphorical carpet from under SCAF’s feet.
Until recently, Morsi had been widely perceived as a willing instrument for a SCAF rule by proxy. If any coup was anticipated it was not this soft coup so subtly perpetrated by Morsi but, rather, a military coup by the Generals.
The first high-profile victim of Morsi’s new found political dexterity was Major General Murad Muwafi, SCAF’s Chief of Intelligence. Morsi is close to Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and I have been told that he determined Muwafi should go when the latter refused to agree a plan to re-open the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt on a permanent basis.
Even after the revolution, SCAF had ensured that the status quo with Israel was maintained, co-ordinating all security and military activities with Tel Aviv. This displeased Morsi who last week demonstrated a more robust approach to Israel, sending Egyptian troops, tanks and helicopters into occupied Sinai in response to the murder of 16 Egyptian border guards by masked militants near Rafah.
Morsi presented Israel with a fait accompli and a bitter choice: If it wanted to effectively counteract the growing band of jihadis (undoubtedly eager to launch attacks inside Israel) in the increasingly lawless Sinai, it would have to accept an Egyptian military presence in the territory even though this would greatly compromise Camp David.
Next Morsi forced the resignations of SCAF’s top men, Field Marshall Mohammad Hussein Tantawi and Lt.. General Sami Anan which were announced during a live broadcast on Monday. I have been told that the men only learned their fate when they saw it on television. Since Morsi publically appointed their replacements at the same time, they were unlikely to object since to do so would have resulted in an unprecedented split within the 200 year-old Egyptian Army.
Morsi replaced Tantawi with a Chief of Staff of his own choosing, the much younger Lt. General Abdel Fattah Sisi who is not considered part of the Mubarak ‘old guard’. Morsi also made Sisi his Defence Minister and appointed a whole raft of men he could count on to key positions within the army, the navy and the air force.
Since his inauguration, Morsi - who was the Moslem Brotherhood’s second choice for the role - had been mocked for his apparent acquiescence and weakness. He faced a campaign of vilification and ridicule in the pro-Mubarak wings of the Egyptian media, in particular a talk show hosted by Tawfik Okasha and the newspaper al-Dustour.
The new, tough, Morsi this week instructed Egypt’s chief prosecutor to bring charges of defamation against Okasha and Islam Afifi, the editor-in-chief of al-Dustour. The former has already lost his job.
Political activists and the demonstrators who powered the uprising have reacted to Morsi’s strong-arm approach against the remnants of the ancien regime with enthusiam. They took to Tahrir Square in their thousands to celebrate Morsi’s victory over the hated Junta.
Yet the power the new President has heaped upon himself could prove to be a double-edged sword. He has (for now at least) managed to return the military to its barracks to focus on what is supposed to be doing – protecting Egypt’s borders and population. However it is the constitution - which is currently being drafted by a 100-member council – that will be key to a stable, harmonious future for the people of Egypt and a government of national unity.
This document has already become the source of bitter disagreement between the secular liberal element and the Islamists who wish to establish a Shari’a-based model.
Among the powers Morsi granted himself is the authority to overrule the constitutional council. Morsi remains deeply conservative, although he renounced his membership of the Moslem Brotherhood on assuming the Presidency.
In addition, by offering the Generals a face-saving exit via ‘resignation’, Morsi implies a reluctance to generate the kind of full-blown confrontation with the military which would see them tried for the murder of around 800 protestors during the revolution, as well as various human rights abuses. Many protestors would want the new government to pursue Mubarak’s generals through the courts.
The new President’s monopoly over the state’s institutions and the decision-making process will rival that of his predecessor, Hosni Mubarak. Morsi has secured for himself the right to autonomously set public policy, sign international agreements and create new legislature.
Many fear that this will result in a new administration with formidable power, dominated by the Moslem Brotherhood and those close to Morsi. In effect, a religious dictatorship.
It is to be hoped that President Morsi will use the power he has secured from SCAF wisely, for the benefit of all Egyptians and their fellow Arabs.
The Palestinians have reason to be hopeful that Morsi’s administration will not continue with the policies of his predecessors which were biased in favour of Israel’s interests.
Indeed, Israel may end up the biggest loser in the current shake-up. Having already lost one powerful friend – Turkey - it now faces losing a second in Egypt. The US, too, watches in alarm having invested $35 billion in military aid to Egypt over the years in order to ensure its support for its client state.
Turkey turned its back on Israel in the aftermath of the latter’s violent attack on Turkish peace activists bound for Gaza in the flotilla. Mohammad Morsi has good relations with Gaza’s ruling Hamas, which will undoubtedly influence his foreign policy decisions and may undermine existing peace agreements.
Palestinians are calling this effect the ‘Curse of Gaza’.
