There is every reason for doubt, and even alarm, about developments in Egypt. I have written, stated and often repeated that the uprising that led to the events of January 25 2011 was hardly as spontaneous as it seemed and that, since then, the military—or at least a particular faction within the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces—(SCAF) has never entirely lost control of the situation. Confirmation came with the astonishing condemnation of former president Hosni Mubarak and the acquittal of all but one of the other accused (including his sons, whose involvement in the shady inner workings of the former regime and role in high level corruption were an open secret). The picture is one of carefully orchestrated “change” that has allowed the power structure to rid itself of embarrassing elements while consolidating its political, military and economic domination. I cannot help thinking back to the words of Henri Guaino, Nicolas Sarkozy’s former advisor, after a television debate in November 2011: “There has been no revolution in Egypt. Only a military coup d’état.”
The candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) scored a narrow victory in the first round. Before looking more closely at what his victory means, it would be appropriate to analyze the organization’s positions. The MB did not participate in the earliest demonstrations; it was not until much later (officially, on the eve of January 25) that it joined the mass movement that had taken to the streets against the dictatorial Mubarak regime. The younger generation of the MB had forced the leadership’s hand; the tension and internal division that followed were substantial and lasting. The MB finally got a strong position within the uprising due to its historical credibility in opposition (where its members were tortured, imprisoned, and exiled), to being seen as the protectors of the Islamic reference, as well as to their superior organization and grass-roots capacity for mobilization. This led to an excellent score in the country’s parliamentary elections. But the surprise participation of the Salafis, whose presence seemed designed to embarrass the MB, placed the MB in a delicate position between the military establishment, the secularists and the Salafis. Some members of the organization made no secret of their contacts with the Armed Forces. Concerned with playing a lead role and with protecting their dominant position led them to adopt strategies that widened the gap between the organization and popular aspirations, and led them to lean toward the SCAF. The MB reacted timidly to the abolition of the committee formed to draft a new constitution that cast a shroud of uncertainty over the political and electoral process, raising questions about democratic transparency and the role and legitimacy of the institutions of the state.
The MB had promised that its party, Freedom and Justice, would not field a candidate in the presidential election. The decision was one of the reasons for the expulsion of Abd al-Moneim Abu al-Futuh from the organization, which had opposed his candidacy. Shortly thereafter, in an abrupt about-face, the MB nominated Khayrat al-Shater, and then, Mohammad Morsi. The decision was a curious one, motivated either by assurance of victory at the ballot box, or by the self-interested encouragement of a SCAF anxious to split opposition ranks. Instead of its historical role as a party of opposition to the power structure, the MB suddenly found itself caught up in a race for the presidency that demanded compromises, undercut the very basis of its credibility and raised questions about its choices, and about the role and intentions of the military. The first round results, said to have been free and fair, were startling: Mohammad Morsi had a narrow lead over the former regime’s candidate, a friend of the military and protector of its economic privileges and murky financial interests. There had been no fraud, it was asserted. But the outcome could not have better suited the new power center in the post-Mubarak military.
