Why Netanyahu will miss Sarkozy

French President Nicolas Sarkozy was last year caught telling

President Barack Obama that he “can’t stand”  Benjamin Netanyahu and

branding the Israeli prime minister “a liar.” But Netanyahu may miss

Sarkozy more than most world leaders should the French leader, as

seems likely, fail to secure reelection. Not only has Sarkozy been the

most Israel-friendly French president ever, but he is also Israel’s

best bet for holding Western leaders to a hard line on Iran.

The hyperactive hawkish Sarkozy has played the leading role in pushing

both Europe and the U.S. to toughen their stance on Iran and raise

pressure on Tehran through sanctions on its energy and banking

sectors. Indeed, he has consistently pressed President Obama from the

right on the issue, and has been the leading voice of skepticism among

Western leaders on diplomatic compromise efforts to resolve the

nuclear standoff. Even if his likely successor, Francois Hollande,

maintains France’s formal stance on Iran, he’s unlikely to repeat

Sarkozy’s activist role in pressing others to a more hawkish position

and challenging compromise scenarios.

As Western powers enter negotiations with Iran to settle the nuclear

standoff, there’s no sign that Iran is about to capitulate to the full

menu of Western demands. Still, should Tehran be willing to take

concrete and verifiable steps to ease international concerns over the

nature of its program, Western powers will face the challenge of

defining acceptable compromises. And it’s in that discussion that

Sarkozy could prove to be a spoiler in a manner that would please

Netanyahu.

The Istanbul talks agreed a framework for negotiations based on the

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and a principle of reciprocity.

Although the NPT obliges Iran to account for all its nuclear work to

the satisfaction of the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA)—which Iran has yet to do—it also guarantees Tehran’s right to

enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. That means a diplomatic solution

based on the NPT would strengthen safeguards against Iran using its

nuclear capability to build weapons, but would not dismantle and

remove Iran’s enrichment capability—as Israel and France have

demanded.

The Obama Administration’s position on the enrichment issue has been

more ambiguous, having initially inherited the Bush Administration’s

zero-enrichment stance, but more recently spoken of Iran having the

right to a peaceful nuclear program in line with the NPT. Netanyahu’s

hopes for pressing the Western powers to resist any compromise that

leaves Iran with the capacity to enrich uranium wiil be substantially

diminished if Sarkozy leaves the scene.

The French leader has been the leading voice of skepticism over

negotiations among Western leaders, and has energetically pressed both

the Obama Administration and European governments to adopt tougher

sanctions that have had a painful impact on the Iranian economy.

Britain supports France’s zero-enrichment demand, but hasn’t been

quite as activist in promoting it. London is also more likely,

analysts say, to go along with the consensus if Western powers can

fashion an interim deal that offers concrete progress in reinforcing

barriers to Iran using its nuclear program to create weapons, even if

that leaves the issue of Iran’s ongoing low-level enrichment

unresolved for now. A nuclear compromise involving steps to diminish

the danger of weaponization in the near term, but which leaves Iran

with the capacity to enrich uranium and at the same time eases

international pressure on Tehran, is precisely what the Israelis fear

right now. And Sarkozy, while rejecting Israel’s threat to take

military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, could be more

willing to push back against a compromise on the enrichment issue than

Hollande would be.

The Socialist candidate, if he wins the presidency, is expected to be

more of a low-key team player than Sarkozy, who demands the limelight

and has been willing to publicly challenge the Obama Administration to

take a tougher line. Hollande’s plate will be full in managing

domestic challenges, and his key foreign policy priority as president

would be renegotiating the treaty to save the eurozone. Foreign policy

dossiers such as Iran and Syria are likely to be returned to the

French Foreign Ministry, in contrast to Sarkozy’s habit of taking

personal charge. So even if the formal policy remains the same,

Sarkozy’s ouster would silence the most important cheerleader for a

hard line on Iran in the Western camp. That’s why all stakeholders in

the Iran nuclear standoff will be watching closely when French voters

return to the polls on May 6 to settle the matter of whether Sarkozy

will have a second term.